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Introduction
Consider the classical problem of dividing a dollar by majority rule. Suppose there are n parties, party i has ω i votes and q votes (q > i∈N ω i 2
) are needed to achieve a majority. The relation between voting weights and actual payoff division is not straightforward. If there are three parties controlling 4, 3 and 2 votes respectively and 5 votes are needed to get a majority, the three parties are actually symmetric and one would expect a two-party coalition dividing the payoff equally. 1 In other cases, ex post payoffs proportional to the number of votes seem natural. For example, let ω 1 = 2, ω 2 = ω 3 = ω 4 = 1 and q = 3. There are two kinds of minimal winning coalitions: the large party together with a small party, and all the small parties together (games with this property are called apex games). It is natural to assume that the three small parties would get 1 3 each if they formed a coalition and that, since the large party can replace two small parties, it would receive their combined payoff, 2 3 , in the event of being in the coalition that forms. Suppose the distribution of votes is such that the game is constant-sum (no ties are possible) and a homogeneous representation exists (even if not all minimal winning coalitions control the same number of votes, we can assign equivalent voting weights to the players so that all minimal winning coalitions have the same total voting weight). Assuming that a player and a group that can replace it in a minimal winning coalition must have the same payoff leads to a unique prediction for ex post payoffs: they must be proportional to the homogeneous voting weights (see Peleg [28] , theorem 3.5, and Ostmann [27] , lemma 4.9). Many cooperative solution concepts make this prediction, including von Neumann-Morgenstern's [33] main simple solution, the set of balanced aspirations (Cross [11] ), the competitive solution (McKelvey et al. [20] ) and the demand bargaining set (Morelli and Montero [24] ). 1 We assume that voters are not bound by fairness norms that would force them to divide the payoff proportionally to their number of votes; cf. Gamson [16] .
Despite proportional payoffs being intuitive and supported by many cooperative solution concepts, they are not supported by the leading noncooperative bargaining models. The most influential model of bargaining in majority games is the closed rule model of Baron and Ferejohn [3] , which is based on Rubinstein [29] and Binmore [7] . 2 In this model, a player is randomly selected to make a proposal specifying a payoff for each of the n players. The model has a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria, and the one selected by refinements leads to a large proposer advantage. Hence, ex post payoffs are far from being proportional. Other proposal-based models lead to payoff divisions that tend to be egalitarian rather than proportional (Chatterjee et al. [10] ) or predict that the first proposer gets everything (Bloch and Rottier [8] ). 3 An alternative approach to bargaining, introduced by Binmore [6] for three-player games and generalized by Selten [30] , is based not on complete proposals but on demands. Players sequentially announce the payoff they require in order to participate in a coalition, and a coalition is formed by players making compatible demands. Because with demand bargaining a player is not always facing a unique proposal but may be able to compare different demands and choose the best coalition, one might expect the outcome of demand bargaining to be more competitive. Indeed, Binmore [6] calls his demand bargaining model a market bargaining model.
Morelli [23] uses a demand bargaining model to analyze weighted majority games. In this model, the Head of State chooses the first mover, and the latter chooses the order in which the parties formulate demands. This model was originally thought to yield proportional payoffs; however, extreme coun- 2 This model has led to many applications and extensions. Recent related papers include Banks and Duggan [2] , Diermeier et al. [13] and Kalandrakis [17] . 3 Proportionality results can be obtained in the context of the Baron-Ferejohn model (see Montero [21] ). However, this proportionality is ex ante (ex post the proposer obtains more than half of the total payoff) and in order to hold generally it requires the recognition probabilities to be themselves proportional.
terexamples were later found. Because the first mover chooses the order of moves, it may be able to play the remaining parties off against each other and obtain the whole payoff, even though the rules of the game allow the other parties to exclude the first mover (see Montero and Vidal-Puga [22] ). 4 In this paper we study a demand bargaining procedure in which the players must move in decreasing order of size. This procedure mirrors the assumption of Austen-Smith and Banks [1] that parties are asked to try to form a government in decreasing order of weight. Parties making demands in decreasing order of weight is not a completely unnatural assumption. In some countries the largest party must be asked to form the government first;
in the absence of this rule the largest party is still selected quite often. 5 We analyze situations in which the distribution of votes is well-behaved so that the resulting majority game is constant-sum and an equivalent homogeneous representation exists. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is unique, and equilibrium payoffs inside the coalition that forms are proportional to the homogeneous voting weights.
The proportionality result is remarkable for its generality and for the simplicity of the bargaining procedure. Because players move in a fixed order, one might expect some players to find themselves in a favorable position in the sequence and exploit it (this is what happens in [22] and [8] ).
However, it turns out that moving by decreasing weight generates enough competitive pressure so that no player gets a disproportionate payoff within 4 Other demand bargaining models in the literature would lead to multiple subgame perfect equilibria for majority games (Bennett and van Damme [5] , Winter [34] , Dasgupta and Chiu [12] , and Vidal-Puga [32] ) or have not been explored beyond symmetric games (Cardona-Coll and Mancera [9] ) or apex games (Frechette et al. [15] ). 5 The Greek constitution prescribes that the leader of the largest party must be chosen as the first formateur; if he fails, the leader of the second largest party is selected, to be followed by the leader of the third largest party if he too fails. Even if the constitution is silent on this matter, a convention may emerge (Laver and Schofield, 1990 , p. 210). Diermeier and Merlo (2004) analyze formateur selection empirically and find that the largest party is not necessarily the formateur but is disproportionally likely to be selected.
the coalition that forms.
The proof is based on a recursive argument in which each player anticipates that a coalition will form that maximizes the benefit per vote of the remaining members in the coalition. This happens on and off the equilibrium path, and it happens despite substantial nonproportionality of demands off the equilibrium path.
The uniqueness of SPE payoffs result is far from trivial. Even though the game has a finite horizon, there are two potential sources of multiplicity.
One is that the game is not finite since demands can be any real number between 0 and 1. The other one is that players face choices between which they (but not other players!) are indifferent. 6 If we change the order in which players move, the proportionality and uniqueness results break down. We also show that there are minimal winning coalitions that cannot form with a proportional division for any order of moves.
When the game is not constant-sum or an equivalent homogeneous representation does not exist, the reasons to expect proportional payoffs are weaker. The intuitive reasoning based on the substitutability of players in minimal winning coalitions may lead to several possible answers or to a contradiction, and the cooperative solution concepts do not necessarily predict proportionality. Neither does our demand bargaining model, as we show in section 4.
2 The model
Weighted majority games
Consider a legislature in which n parties are represented. We denote them as N = {1, 2, ..., n}. There is a budget of size 1 to be divided by majority rule. Each player i has ω i votes, and a quota of q is needed for a majority.
Denote (ω i ) i∈N by ω. The pair [q; ω] is called a weighted majority game.
Notice that the game is not affected if weights and quota are multiplied by the same positive constant.
Given a vector x ∈ R n and a coalition S ⊂ N, we denote as x S the sum of the coordinates of the members of S, x S := i∈S x i .
A coalition S ⊂ N is winning if ω S ≥ q; it is minimal winning if it is winning and no T S is winning. We denote as W (q, ω) the set of all winning coalitions, and as W m (q, ω) the set of all minimal winning coalitions.
We will omit the arguments q and ω when no confusion can arise. A dummy player is one who does not belong to any minimal winning coalition.
A weighted majority game is constant-sum if S ∈ W ⇐⇒ N\S / ∈ W for all S. It admits an equivalent homogeneous representation if there exists a vector of votes ω h and a quota q h such that
A weighted majority game that admits an equivalent homogeneous representation is called a homogeneous game. there is no restriction on the weight ratio between the medium-size and the small player as the medium-size player cannot be replaced by smaller players in a minimal winning coalition. Requiring that the game be constant-sum ensures that the set of minimal winning coalitions is sufficiently rich so that the homogeneous representation is unique whenever it exists. 7 As will become clear from the analysis, dummy players must get 0 in equilibrium, so for simplicity we assume there are no dummy players. In what follows, we will take [q; ω] to be the homogeneous representation with ω n = 1; i.e. the weakest player has exactly 1 vote. Under these circumstances, every player in a constant-sum homogeneous game has a positive integer number of votes. Furthermore, ω N = 2q − 1 and any S that is maximal losing (i.e. S is losing and no T S is losing) has ω S = q − 1 (see Ostmann [27] , lemma 4.11 and theorem 5.6).
The bargaining procedure
Let there be a constant-sum homogeneous game with homogeneous repre-
There is a budget of size 1 to be divided. Player i's utility function is u i (x i ), where x i is i's share of the budget, and u ′ i (x i ) > 0 for all x i . Bargaining proceeds as follows. Players move in decreasing order of weight. We label the players in this order, so that player 1 moves first, followed by player 2, etc. 8 Each player i makes a demand d i , following the order of play, where 1] is the share of the budget player i claims. If, after player i makes 7 This uniquess is up to multiplication by a positive constant and to the weight that is assigned to dummies, which may be 0 or a sufficiently small number (Peleg [28] ). 8 Of course, since it may be the case that ωi = ωj for some i and j, the bargaining procedure is uniquely defined only up to a permutation of players with the same weight.
Notice that selection by decreasing seat share in legislative bargaining is a particular case of selection by decreasing voting weight.
its demand, there exists a winning coalition S ⊂ {j : j ≤ i} such that d S ≤ 1, player i has the option to form S, in which case payoffs are distributed according to the demands made. If there is more than one possible S, player i decides which one is formed. 9 If player n forms no coalition, the game ends with each player getting zero. 10 Thus, our bargaining procedure is identical to that in [12] , except that the order of moves must be by decreasing weight rather than randomly determined at the start.
Given i ∈ N, we denote as P i the set of predecessors of i. Namely:
If players move by decreasing weight, one can find a minimal winning coalition of players {1, ..., i} that move consecutively, as the following lemma
shows.
Lemma 1 Let [q; ω] be a weighted majority game. There is a player i such
Proof. Consider the smallest i such that S = {1, ..., i} is a winning coalition.
If S / ∈ W m , there must be a minimal winning coalition S ′ ⊂ S, and S ′ is obtained from S by deleting at least one player j < i. This is impossible because by assumption {1, ..., i − 1} is a losing coalition, and, since ω j ≥ ω i for all j < i, this coalition has at least as many votes as S ′ .
We denote this minimal winning coalition of the players who move first by S * . We now show that the total payoff is divided among the players in this coalition. We start by showing that any player who gets the move receives a positive payoff as long as there is still a positive payoff to be 9 Note that player i is not forced to form a coalition whenever feasible; this feature of the game is essential to ensure the existence of an SPE at all subgames (cf. example 1). 10 Any finite number of bargaining rounds T would lead to the same predictions.
Proposition 1 Let [q; ω] be a weighted majority game. Suppose we are in B (d, i) and min S∈W {d S∩P i } < 1. In any SP E of this subgame a winning coalition T ∋ i is formed and i receives at least
Proof. We proceed by induction on i. For i = n, it is clear that m i is the payoff that player n receives by forming a coalition S ∈ W that minimizes
Assume the result holds for i + 1. Suppose that player i demands m i .
Then there is a positive payoff available to players moving after i, and under the induction hypothesis a winning coalition S ∋ i + 1 is formed and player i + 1 must receive a positive amount. Let j > i be the player that forms the winning coalition. If i ∈ S, the proof is done. If i / ∈ S, we have two cases:
If j = i + 1, coalition T = (S\ {i + 1}) ∪ {i} is also winning and player i can form it, winning 1 − d T \{i} , which is clearly higher than m i .
If j > i + 1, consider the set S ∩ {i + 1, ...., j − 1} (which has at least one element, i + 1). Since player j has chosen these players and not player i, and player i has at least as many votes as any of them, we deduce that Proof. Proposition 1 implies that the set of players who get a positive payoff is a nonempty set of consecutive players starting from player 1. Denote this set by P i+1 , where i is the last player to receive a positive payoff. Because of the previous corollary, this set cannot be larger than S * . Suppose it is smaller than S * . Because there are no veto players, N\{i} is winning. Also,
If the game is constant-sum and homogeneous we are able to be more precise about equilibrium strategies and payoffs. Example 1 below illustrates the main features of equilibrium strategies for these games. Given the demands of the players that have moved so far, player i determines two things:
the optimal coalition to be (eventually) formed and the optimal demand to make. In general, the optimal coalition S will control exactly q votes, and will include some players that have moved before i, as well as some players moving after i. Since T = S ∩ P i is a group of players that have already formulated a demand, 1 − d T is the benefit from buying the votes of the players in T ; this benefit will be shared by the players in S\T . Buying less votes leads to a higher benefit, but more votes from players moving after i will be needed to complete a winning coalition. We will show that S is chosen so that the average benefit per vote,
The optimal demand for player i will normally be
, that is, player i will claim a share of the benefit proportional to its number of votes.
However, there are subgames off the equilibrium path in which player i can demand more than a proportional share. Showing that player i maximizes
even though it does not always claim a proportional share of this benefit will be part of the challenge of the proof.
Example 1 also illustrates a feature of extensive form games with continuous action spaces: not every SPE of a subgame can be extended to an SPE of the overall game because ties cannot always be broken in an arbitrary way. Players may have to solve ties in a certain way in order to ensure that players moving earlier in the game have a best response (see [5] ). Suppose one of the first two options is optimal. Then player 5 will form
Ties are broken in favor of forming the coalition that includes player 4, to guarantee that player 4 has a best response in the previous stage. Hence the maximum demand 4 can make and still get into a coalition with 5 is
At stage 4, player 4 faces a vector of demands (d
or make a demand that will lead to {1, 4, 5}. It forms
Thus, player 4 is effectively comparing the average benefit associated to buying the votes of 2 and 3 (in which case 1 vote is enough to complete a winning coalition) or the votes of 1 (in which case 2 votes are needed to complete a winning coalition and 4 must share the benefit with 5).
From the inequality above, the maximum demand player 3 can make at the previous stage and still induce {2, 3, 4} is
11 In order to simplify the proof, we only consider minimal winning coalitions. A coalition like {1, 2, 5} could be relevant if d2 ≤ d4 and 1 − d1 − d2 > 0, but this requires player 2 to have acted irrationally: player 2 would have been better-off by setting d2 = 1 − d1 and forming coalition {1, 2}.
At stage 3, player 3 faces a vector of demands (d 1 , d 2 ). It can form coalition {1, 3} or make a demand that will induce {2, 3, 4}. It makes a demand if
Again, player 3 may buy the votes of player 1 (in which case 2 votes are required to complete a winning coalition), or the votes of player 2 (in which case 3 votes are required to complete a winning coalition). It chooses the alternative with the highest average benefit.
The maximum demand player 2 can make in the previous stage and still induce coalition {2, 3, 4} is
At stage 2, player 2 compares 1 − d 1 and
. This inequality can be rewritten as and coalition {1, 2} is formed.
The proportionality result
In this section we present and prove the main result of the paper, namely that moving in decreasing order of weight leads to a competitive outcome (proportional payoffs within a minimal winning coalition) for well behaved games.
Theorem 1 Let [q; ω] be a constant-sum homogeneous game. Suppose players play a demand bargaining game in decreasing order of weight. Then in any subgame perfect equilibrium coalition S * forms with each player i de-
The result trivially follows if there is a veto player. In constant-sum games, a veto player must be a dictator, thus ω 1 = q, and player 1 can set d 1 = 1 and form coalition {1}. Assume from now on that ω i < q for all i.
The proof of theorem 1 is divided into three parts: description of strategies that lead to coalition S * forming with proportional payoffs, showing that the strategies constitute an SPE of the game, and showing that equilibrium SPE payoffs are unique.
Strategies
We start by eliminating all strategies that involve strictly dominated choices
By demanding less than it
can get by forming a coalition, player i gets a lower payoff regardless of the actions of players moving after i.
Candidate coalitions
Given the demands of the players that have moved so far, player i determines two things: the optimal winning coalition to be (eventually) formed and the optimal demand to make. Player i will consider winning coalitions S that include some players from N\P i (player i and possibly players that move after it) and may also include some predecessors from P i . Let α be the number of votes controlled by players in S ∩ (N\P i ). The players in S ∩ P i must control at least q − α votes. We denote by b (i, α) the maximum benefit that can be achieved by buying these q − α votes from players in P i .
Player i can calculate b(i, α) for every feasible value of α. Not all integers between 0 and q are feasible for every player: α cannot be so small that even the votes of all the players in P i would not suffice, and it cannot exceed the votes of all players in N\P i . Let γ i 0 := max(q − ω P i , 0) and δ i := ω N\P i . In order for b(i, α) to exist we need γ i 0 ≤ α ≤ δ i . Player i will consider values of α between γ i = max{1, γ i 0 } and δ i . The lower bound of 1 appears because player i only considers coalitions with S ∋ i, and ω i ≥ 1.
It follows from lemma 4.9 in Ostmann [27] that ω i ≤ δ i+1 for all i < n, thus
For player 1 only α ≥ q is feasible and b(1, α) = 1 for all α ≥ q. For player n, only α = 1 is feasible and b(n, 1) is simply n's payoff from buying the votes of one of the cheapest coalitions controlling at least q − 1 votes.
We denote as Σ i the set of values between γ i and δ i that maximize
Thus:
Obviously, the set Σ i depends on the demands made by the players in Lemma 2 Suppose we are in the subgame B (d, i). Then
Proof. "⊂" is left to the reader.
and contains player i. There are two possibilities:
If T ∪ (N\P i+1 ) is also winning, ω T ≥ q − δ i+1 and the result follows.
If T ∪ (N\P i+1 ) is losing, its complement, (N\T ) ∩ P i+1 , is winning and contains player i as the weakest member. By taking out player i, we obtain the coalition (N\T ) ∩ P i which is losing (since its complement T ∪ (N\P i ) is winning). Thus, (N\T ) ∩ P i+1 is minimal winning and T ∪ (N\P i+1 ) is maximal losing. Because maximal losing coalitions control q − 1 votes, 
. If b i, σ i ≥ 0, a coalition can still be formed. 12 Player i will use the set Σ i to determine which coalition will be formed. The set Σ i will not generally produce a unique answer but a set of candidate coalitions, one of which will eventually be formed. Intuitively, a candidate coalition should be of the form S ∪ {i, ..., i + l}, where S ∈ arg max T ⊂P i :ω T ≥q−σ i 1 − d T is the group of players that have already moved whose votes will be bought, {i, ..., i + l} is a set of consecutive players that control exactly σ i votes, and σ i ∈ Σ i . The reason why {i, ..., i + l} ought to be a group of consecutive players is that any plans to exclude a player between i and i + l may well be sabotaged by this player when it gets the move.
It is not immediate that coalitions satisfying the above conditions always exist. For example, in the game [7; 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1] , finding Σ 2 = {1} or Σ 2 = {4} would preclude their existence, and Σ 2 would not be a reliable guide to choosing a coalition. We now show that a coalition can always be constructed as described above. We start by showing that, given homogeneity and our elimination of strictly dominated demands, there can be no positive benefit from setting α < ω i .
Lemma 3 Let
Hence, since the game is homogeneous, T ∪ {i} cannot be minimal win- 
, so the interval is nonempty).
For any values of σ i ∈ Σ i and τ i ∈ T i , we define
Intuitively, player i wants to form a coalition with α = σ i and to claim as much of b i, σ i as possible, but it must take into account that player i + 1 can obtain a benefit per vote of
player i + 1 is helpless and player i can claim the whole b i, σ i . Otherwise, player i must allow a benefit of
per vote for the players moving after it that will provide the remaining σ i − ω i votes, thus
per vote without resorting to buying the votes of player i and thus
Note that d * i is defined irrespective of whether player i forms a coalition after formulating this demand. Also, d * i is independent of the particular choice of σ i ∈ Σ i and τ i ∈ T i . By definition, b(i,τ i ) 
Note that player i chooses a coalition based on maximizing
σ i , even though players moving after i are paid at a potentially lower rate. Shouldn't player i take more votes from N\P i+1 given that it needs to pay these players less? The answer is no. The inequality
is only possible when , the maximum benefit per vote player 3 can achieve is 
Inductive definition of strategies
In B (d, n), player n sets d n = 0 and forms no coalition if b(n, 1) < 0.
Otherwise, player n forms a coalition S∪{n} with S ∈ arg max T ⊂Pn:ω T ≥q−ωn
If there is more than one possible choice of S, player n uses the tie-breaking rule.
Let i < n and assume we have defined the strategies for players in B (d, i + 1). In B (d, i), player i sets d i = 0 and forms no coalition if b(i, σ i ) < 0. Otherwise, player i proceeds as follows:
2. If Σ i = {ω i }, player i forms coalition S ∪ {i} with S ∈ arg min
If there is more than one possible choice of S, player i uses the tiebreaking rule.
3. If {ω i } Σ i , player i can anticipate the coalition S ′ that would be formed should it demand d * i and form no coalition, given that its followers play the strategies we have defined.
(a) If i / ∈ S ′ , player i forms coalition S ∪{i} with S ∈ arg min
If there is more than one possible S, player i uses the tie-breaking rule.
(b) If i ∈ S ′ , player i compares the coalitions S ∈ arg max
and S ′ ∩ P i . Among them, player i selects a coalition following the tie-breaking rule. If S ′ is chosen, player i demands
given as in (1) . If S = S ′ is chosen, then player i demands
and forms coalition S ∪ {i}. 13 These strategies lead to proportional payoffs as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 4
If players follow the strategies described above, coalition S * forms with each player demanding d i = ω i q . 13 In case of a tie between S ′ ∩ Pi and some S ∈ arg max
case that can only happen if b(i, σ i ) = 0) S is chosen (S ′ would do just as well).
Proof. Because of lemma 1, S * = P l+1 for some value of l. We can show
q for i = 1, ..., l by induction on i. Player 1 finds Σ 1 = {q} and, since q ≤ δ 2 (due to the absence of veto players) sets a demand d
q for all j ∈ P i , and q − ω P i ∈ Σ i . Then, since
If i < l, q − ω P i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 and induction continues. If i = l, S * is formed because of the tie-breaking rule.
We now illustrate how the strategies would work off the equilibrium path ). Note that proportionality is not respected off the equilibrium path in this example. Proof. Since b i, σ i /σ i is maximum, we deduce that b (i, α) < 0 for every α ≥ γ i . The same occurs for α = 0 since b (i, α) is nondecreasing in α. This means that no winning coalition can be formed. Suppose b i, σ i ≥ 0 for the rest of this section. We need to prove that, given that the remaining players follow the strategies described, player i's equilibrium demand is d * i . There are two parts to this result, both of which will be proven by induction over i in proposition 2:
Showing that the described strategies constitute an SPE
1. Player i always gets d * i if it follows the prescribed strategy. This is obvious if player i's strategy requires player i to form a coalition. If the strategy requires that i does not form a coalition (which can only happen if σ i > ω i for some σ i ∈ Σ i ), player i is relying on other players to include it in a coalition. There are some auxiliary lemmas that will help us to prove by induction that i gets d * i in this case. The lemmas essentially state that player i + 1's plans do not contradict i's plans: Σ i+1 contains σ i − ω i , and candidate coalitions for i and i + 1 are compatible. This is proven in the following steps:
(a) Lemma 6 shows how b(i + 1, α) is determined from b(i, ·) and d i . 
Lemma 6 Suppose we are in
Proof. See Supplementary material.
The next lemma shows that, if player i + 1 wants to set α = σ i − ω i , one of the cheapest ways to buy q − σ i − ω i votes from P i+1 involves buying player i's votes (equation (2)). Also, the benefit per vote of setting (3)). This inequality plays a fundamental role in showing that d * i is optimal: if the inequality would not hold, i + 1 could obtain a higher benefit per vote by excluding i; if a strict inequality was possible for d i = d * i , player i could increase its demand without being excluded by i + 1.
Lemma 7 Suppose we are in
and, given any τ i ∈ T i ,
Furthermore, the inequality in (3) is strict iff
Sketch of the proof. (See Supplementary material for details). Equation (2) is proven using lemma 6. Suppose player i + 1 sets α = σ i − ω i . If 
, it is the case that
(by definition of τ i ) and (1)). Combining these two inequalities leads to b i,
, one of the values of α that maximize benefit per vote for i + 1 is σ i − ω i . There may be candidate coalitions for i + 1 that do not involve i (associated with σ i − ω i or with another σ i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 ) but (2) implies that at least one coalition does.
Lemma 8 Suppose we are in B (d, i + 1) and σ i > ω i for some σ i ∈ Σ i . If
Sketch of the proof. (See Supplementary material for details). We need to prove that 
The next lemma makes a connection between the coalitions that maximize benefit per vote for player i and the ones that do so for player i + 1
If i finds that buying the votes of coalition S is optimal, i + 1 will find that buying the votes of S ∪ {i} is optimal. Conversely, if i + 1 finds that buying the votes of a coalition S ∋ i is optimal, i also finds that buying the votes of S\{i} is optimal. There may be other coalitions that are optimal for i + 1 and do not contain i or the reverse (the latter happens if ω i ∈ Σ i ) but if we restrict attention to coalitions involving i and i + 1, exactly the same coalitions are optimal for i and i + 1.
Lemma 9 Suppose we are in B (d, i + 1), σ i > ω i for some σ i ∈ Σ i and
Sketch of the proof. (See Supplementary material for details). Part a)
follows immediately from the previous two lemmas: it is optimal for i + 1
to buy σ i − ω i votes (lemma 8) and to involve player i (equation (2) 
Re-arranging this expression leads to 
The proof exploits the fact that we know the value of
from equation (3) and that σ i − ω i ∈ Σ i+1 , so that (3) is also the value of
. For the subcase σ i ≤ δ i+1 , this knowledge can be used to show that σ i+1 + ω i ∈ Σ i . For the subcase σ i > δ i+1 , it can be used to prove by contradiction that b(i,
The next lemma shows that a player that demands more than d * i will be excluded from the next mover's planned coalition.
Lemma 10 Assume we are in B(d, i + 1) and
for some/all τ i ∈ T i , then every player obtains zero in any SPE of this subgame.
Sketch of the proof.
(See Supplementary material for details) a) If
, it follows from lemmas 7 and 8 that best option that involves buying the votes of player i leads to the same benefit per vote as the best option that does not involve buying the votes of player i. If d i > d * i , the best option that does not involve i is unaffected whereas all options that involve player i now have a lower benefit per vote. b) For b i, τ i < 0 the best alternative option is not to buy any votes at all, since buying votes would lead to a negative benefit. In this case
, that is, by setting
, all winning coalitions have a negative benefit and no coalition can be formed.
We are now in a position to use induction and show that the strategies we constructed constitute an SPE. shows by induction that it is optimal to form a coalition that maximizes benefit per vote and that players who demand d * i will be included in the final coalition whereas players who demand more will be excluded. Lemmas 
Showing uniqueness of SPE payoffs
The next proposition shows uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs by backwards induction. Essentially we show that players must choose a coalition that maximizes the benefit per vote, and that ties must be solved in a certain way.
The uniqueness proof is based on the lemmas introduced so far plus a very simple additional lemma. Lemma 11 shows that, if d i < d * i , all candidate coalitions for player i + 1 involve player i. This result helps us prove that player i can obtain d i by setting d i < d * i in any SPE (one would have to use induction to prove that i + 1 can achieve the coalition it has in mind); hence i + 1 must solve ties in i's favor when d i = d * i or i would not have a best response.
Lemma 11 Suppose we are in B (d, i + 1) and σ i > ω i for some σ i ∈ Σ i .
Proof. Let σ i+1 ∈ Σ i+1 . Suppose by contradiction that there exists a coali- (1); otherwise player i's payoff is zero.
Proof. See Supplementary material. 
Concluding remarks and discussion
We have presented a demand bargaining model that makes sharp predictions regarding coalition formation and payoff division. The model can be extended to any finite horizon, and its predictions are independent of the discount factors and the risk attitudes of the players.
The result rests on two crucial assumptions: the order of moves 14 and the game being well behaved (i.e., constant sum and homogeneous).
If we consider an arbitrary order of moves, it may be possible for one player to get everything (see Montero and Vidal-Puga, [22] ). Multiple SPE are also possible. If we take the game [3; 2, 1, 1, 1] and order the players in such a way that the player with 2 votes is in the third place, no set of consecutive movers of the form {1, ..., i} is a minimal winning coalition. If players move in this order, the first mover cannot get a positive payoff for any demand, and this leads to a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria.
When players move by decreasing weight, the coalition that forms is the minimal winning coalition with the smallest number of players. One may ask whether proportional payoffs can be achieved for an arbitrary minimal winning coalition by choosing the order of moves appropriately. This is sometimes but not always possible. 15 In the game [4; 2, 2, 1, 1, 1], a coalition of type [211] forms with a proportional division if the order of moves is of type [21121] ). In the apex game [3; 2, 1, 1, 1], there is no order of moves for which coalition {2, 3, 4} forms with a proportional payoff division. This coalition can only form if the large player moves last, but then the first mover is able to get everything. 16 The intuitive reason why proportionality fails is that, after the first mover makes a larger than proportional demand, we cannot find a minimal winning coalition moving consecutively and immediately after the first mover, hence coordinating a reaction is difficult and players moving after the first mover may end up sabotaging each other's plans.
If the game is not constant-sum and homogeneous, proportionality may break down. In some cases, this is due to the presence of a player that can be "held hostage" by others, as pointed by Morelli [23] .
Example 3 There are four players, with 3, 2, 2 and 1 votes respectively.
The quota is 5. If the players play a demand bargaining game in decreasing order, any subgame perfect equilibrium results in coalition {1, 2} with d 1 = 1 2 15 For the Baron-Ferejohn model, Kalandrakis [17] shows that any payoff vector can be obtained by manipulating the proposer probabilities. This result is not replicated for fixed order demand bargaining, even though many payoff vectors are feasible due to the multiplicity of SPE for some orders. 16 Proportionality for all coalitions in apex games can be restored if the order of moves is not determined in advance, but the next mover is randomly selected (Fréchette et al, [15] ). How far this result extends beyond apex games is an open question. the aspiration solution concepts of Bennett [4] and the inferior player axiom of Napel and
Widgrén [25] all agree in making this prediction. . Note that player 4 does not always choose the coalition that maximizes benefit per vote; this criterion is not reliable for nonhomogeneous games as it may lead to σ 4 < ω 4 . Also, lemma 2 does not hold for player 4.
